Abortion and crime: who should you believe?

Two very vocal critics, Steve Sailer and John Lott, have been exerting a lot of energy lately trying to convince the world that the abortion reduces crime hypothesis is not correct. A number of readers have asked me to respond to these criticisms. First, let’s start by reviewing the basic facts that support the Donohue-Levitt hypothesis that legalized abortion in the 1970s explains a substantial part of the crime decline in the 1990s:

1) Five states legalized abortion three years before Roe v. Wade. Crime started falling three years earlier in these states, with property crime (done by younger people) falling before violent crime.

2) After abortion was legalized, the availability of abortions differed dramatically across states. In some states like North Dakota and in parts of the deep South, it was virtually impossible to get an abortion even after Roe v. Wade. If one compares states that had high abortion rates in the mid 1970s to states that had low abortion rates in the mid 1970s, you see the following patterns with crime. For the period from 1973-1988, the two sets of states (high abortion states and low abortion states) have nearly identical crime patterns. Note, that this is a period before the generations exposed to legalized abortion are old enough to do much crime. So this is exactly what the Donohue-Levitt theory predicts. But from the period 1985-1997, when the post Roe cohort is reaching peak crime ages, the high abortion states see a decline in crime of 30% relative to the low abortion states. Our original data ended in 1997. If one updated the study, the results would be similar.)

3) All of the decline in crime from 1985-1997 experienced by high abortion states relative to low abortion states is concentrated among the age groups born after Roe v. Wade. For people born before abortion legalization, there is no difference in the crime patterns for high abortion and low abortion states, just as the Donohue-Levitt theory predicts.

4) When we compare arrest rates of people born in the same state, just before and just after abortion legalization, we once again see the identical pattern of lower arrest rates for those born after legalization than before.

5) The evidence from Canada, Australia, and Romania also support the hypothesis that abortion reduces crime.

6) Studies have shown a reduction in infanticide, teen age drug use, and teen age childbearing consistent with the theory that abortion will reduce other social ills similar to crime.

These six points all support the hypothesis. There is one fact that, without more careful analysis, argues against the Donohue-Levitt story:

7) The homicide rate of young males (especially young Black males) temporarily skyrocketed in the late 1980s, especially in urban centers like Los Angeles, New York City, and Washington, DC, before returning to regular levels soon thereafter. These young males who were hitting their peak crime years were born right around the time abortion was legalized.

If you look at the serious criticisms that have been leveled against the Donohue-Levitt hypothesis, virtually all of them revolve around this spike in homicide by young men in the late 1980s-early 1990s. (There are also some non-serious criticisms, which I will address below.) This is the point that Sailer is making, and also the point made far more rigorously by Ted Joyce in an article published in the Journal of Human Resources.

So, a reasonable thing to ask yourself is: Was there anything else going on in the late 1980s that might be causing young Black males to be killing each other at alarming rates that might be swamping the impact of legalized abortion over a short time period? The obvious culprit you might think about is crack cocaine. Crack cocaine was hitting the inner cities at exactly this time, disproportionately affecting minorities, and the violence was heavily concentrated among young Black males such as the gang members we write about in Freakonomics. So to figure out whether this spike in young Black male homicides is evidence against legalized abortion reducing crime, or even evidence legalized abortion causes crime, one needs to control for the crack epidemic to find the answer. This is the argument that I have been making for years. First in the Slate exchange with Steve Sailer back in 1999, then in the Donohue and Levitt response to Ted Joyce, and now in a recent paper by Roland Fryer, Paul Heaton, me, and Kevin Murphy.

The key points I mentioned in Slate five years ago in debating Sailer are reprinted below:

Your hypothesis that crack, not abortion, is the story, provides a testable alternative to our explanation of the facts. You argue:

The arrival of crack led to large increases in crime rates between 1985 and the early ’90s, particularly for inner-city African-American youths. The fall of the crack epidemic left many of the bad apples of this cohort dead, imprisoned, or scared straight. Consequently, not only did crime fall back to its original pre-crack level, but actually dropped even further in a “overshoot” effect.
States that had high abortion rates in the ’70s were hit harder by the crack epidemic, thus any link between falling crime in the ’90s and abortion rates in the ’70s is spurious.

If either assumption 1 or 2 is true, then the crack epidemic can explain some of the rise and fall in crime in the ’80s and ’90s. In order for your crack hypothesis to undermine the “abortion reduces crime” theory, however, all three assumptions must hold true.

So, let’s look at the assumptions one by one and see how they fare.

1)Did the arrival of crack lead to rising youth crime? Yes. No argument from me here.

2) Did the decline in crack lead to a “boomerang” effect in which crime actually fell by more than it had risen with the arrival of crack? Unfortunately for your story, the empirical evidence overwhelmingly rejects this claim. Using specifications similar to those in our paper, we find that the states with the biggest increases in murder over the rising crack years (1985-91) did see murder rates fall faster between 1991 and 1997. But for every 10 percent that murder rose between 1985 and 1991, it fell by only 2.6 percent between 1991 and 1997. For your story to explain the decline in crime that we attribute to legalized abortion, this estimate would have to be about five times bigger. Moreover, for violent crime and property crime, increases in these crimes over the period 1985-91 are actually associated with increases in the period 1991-97 as well. In other words, for crimes other than murder, the impact of crack is not even in the right direction for your story.

3) Were high-abortion-rate states in the ’70s hit harder by the crack epidemic in the ’90s? Given the preceding paragraph, this is a moot point, because all three assumptions must be true to undermine the abortion story, but let’s look anyway. A reasonable proxy for how hard the crack epidemic hit a state is the rise in crime in that state over the period 1985-91. Your theory requires a large positive correlation between abortion rates in a state in the ’70s and the rise in crime in that state between 1985 and 1991. In fact the actual correlations, depending on the crime category, range between -.32 and +.09 Thus, the claim that high-abortion states are the same states that were hit hardest by crack is not true empirically. While some states with high abortion rates did have a lot of crack (e.g., New York and D.C.), Vermont, Kansas, Hawaii, Massachusetts, and Washington were among the 10 states with the highest abortion rates in the ’70s. These were not exactly the epicenters of the crack epidemic.

So, what is the final tally? Two of the key assumptions underlying your alternative hypothesis appear to be false: The retreat of crack has not led to an “overshoot” in crime, causing it to be lower than 1985, and even if it had, the states with high abortion rates in the ’70s do not appear to be affected particularly strongly by the crack epidemic. Moreover, when we re-run our analysis controlling for both changes in crime rates from 1985 to 1991 and the level of crime in 1991, the abortion variable comes in just as strongly as in our original analysis.

Re-reading this response five years later, it still sounds pretty good to me. Interestingly, at the time, Sailer refused to respond directly to my arguments. His response in Slate completely side-stepped the fact that I had destroyed his core argument. He wrote, for instance, “…rather than mud wrestle in numbers here, I’ll privately send you my technical suggestions. In this essay I’ll step back and explain why this straightforward insight [that abortion reduces crime] might not work in practice.” I should note that I am still waiting for those technical suggestions he promised to arrive!! And if you compare his Slate arguments to his “new” article in the American Conservative, you will see that his thinking has not progressed very far on the issue. In contrast, I spent two years working on that paper on crack cocaine, which provides hard, quantitative evidence in favor of those earlier conjectures I had made.

Now let’s talk about John Lott for a minute. Along with John Whitley, he wrote a paper on abortion and crime. It is so loaded with inaccurate claims, errors and statistical mistakes that I hate to even provide a link to it, but for the sake of completeness you can find it here. Virtually nothing in this paper is correct, and it is no coincidence that four years later it remains unpublished. In a letter to the editor at Wall Street Journal, Lott claims that our results are driven by the particular measure of abortions that we used in the first paper. I guess he never bothered to read our response to Joyce in which we show in Table 1 that the results are nearly identical when we use his preferred data source. It is understandable that he could make this argument five years ago, but why would he persist in making it in 2005 when it has been definitively shown to be false? (I’ll let you put on your Freakonomics-thinking-hat and figure out the answer to that last question.) As Lott and Whitley are by now well aware, the statistical results they get in that paper are an artifact of some bizarre choices they made and any reasonable treatment of the data returns our initial results. (Even Ted Joyce, our critic, acknowledges that the basic patterns in the data we report are there, which Lott and Whitley were trying to challenge.)

To anyone who actually made it this far, I applaud you for your patience. Let me simply end with an analogy. Let’s say that we are living in a world in which global warming is taking place, but also a world in which El Nino occasionally leads to radical, short run disruptions in normal weather patterns. You wouldn’t argue that global warming is false because for a year or two we had cold winters. You’d want to figure out what effect El Nino has on winter weather and then see whether controlling for El Nino it looks like global warming is taking place. The impact of legalized abortion on crime is a lot like global warming — it is slow and steady and grows a little year by year. Crack is like El Nino, it comes in with a fury and then largely disappears. That is why I have invested so much time and effort in understanding both abortion and crack, and why the criticisms made against the abortion-reduces-crime hypothesis to date have not been very compelling.

Leave A Comment

Comments are moderated and generally will be posted if they are on-topic and not abusive.

 

COMMENTS: 182

View All Comments »
  1. Hidden due to low comment rating. Click here to see.

    Disliked! Like or Dislike: Thumb up 13 Thumb down 20
  2. Steve Sailer says:

    This is Steve Sailer:

    Isn’t it a logical inevitability that abortion reduces the crime rate? While the historical evidence raises strong doubts about this popular theory, many people assume it must be true on simple logical grounds. A reader writes:

    “You began your “Pre-emptive Executions?” article by asking:

    “Did legalizing abortion in the early 70s reduce crime in the late 90s by allowing “pre-emptive capital punishment” of potential troublemakers?

    “Steve, the answer to the above question is obviously yes. If you abort a disproportionate number of the fetuses that would grow up to be criminals, you must reduce the crime rate. Of course there may be many other factors that effect the crime rate, as you point out, but these factors don’t change the basic fact that elective abortion has reduced the crime rate. To argue otherwise is to make you come off as a doctrinaire conservative, rather than as a scientist.”

    This seems tautological, but keep in mind that in our country, educated people have a notorious history of misreading how not-so-educated people would react to changes in family structure incentives. For example, all the smart people in 1961 favored raising welfare payments to a few hundred dollars per month and giving it to unmarried mothers. Nobody they knew would have a baby out of wedlock just to get a welfare check.

    Levitt assumes that legalizing abortion reduces the “unwantedness” of the babies who do get born. A close reading of Steven Levitt’s book suggests that the reality, however, is not clear at all.

    First, we certainly didn’t see an increase in wantedness by the fathers of the unborn babies that managed to get born. Legalizing abortion reduced the moral pressure on impregnating boyfriends to marry their girlfriends.

    The illegitimacy rate grew steadily from 1964 (which, counterintuitively, was the year The Pill was introduced, yet was also the inflection point in the great illegitimacy upswing), until it suddenly somewhat pleateaued in 1995, the year after the violence rate began dropping, and a few years after the abortion rate began dropping, perhaps not coincidentally.

    Lots of people assume that illegitimacy and abortion must be inversely correlated, but the historical record in America shows that they are both high at the same time and low at the same time.

    The simplest model appears to be that the Crack Era of the early 1990s was when a lot of the offshoots of the Liberal Ascendancy of 1964-1980 — crime, illegitimacy, abortion, and venereal diseases such as AIDS — were seen by many people as all coming home to roost, and a broad turn toward more traditional morality began in reaction to the horrors on the streets.

    After the legalization of abortion, there was not a major drop in unwanted births as Levitt assumed when he concocted his theory, and he still implies even though he knows the facts are otherwise. Instead, there was a major rise in unwanted pregnancies. According to Levitt’s own words, “Conceptions rose by nearly 30 percent, but births actually fell by 6 percent …” I know I reiterate this, but it’s a stunning fact that you never hear in the abortion debate from either side, and it’s a key to grasping what the impact of legalizing abortion was in reality, not theory.

    Nor is it clear that this small decline in birthrate improved the quality of upbringing of the survivors.

    Imagine a woman who started having unprotected sex because abortion was legalized. She gets pregnant, but then, for one reason or another, doesn’t have an abortion.

    Perhaps she hopes that having the baby will persuade the father to marry her. Perhaps when the father refuses to marry her she decides that if no man loves her, well, at least a baby would love her and cheer her up. Maybe all her girlfriends are having babies and it seems like the fashionable thing to do in her circle. Maybe it gets her out of having to go to high school and take a lot of boring classes she doesn’t understand. Perhaps she finds she can get her own public housing project apartment and move out of her nagging mother’s house if she becomes a mother herself, and then she can have sex with all the men she wants. Perhaps she keeps forgetting her appointment at the clinic because she’s not too bright. Perhaps every time she gets the cash together for an abortion, she spends it on drugs first.

    It’s a statistical certainty that millions of babies were conceived because abortion was legalized but then were born for these kind of reasons. How many? I don’t know.

    But it’s not at all impossible that legalizing abortion could have, on the whole, lowered the quality of parents and the upbringing they give their kids. In fact, it seems pretty likely that out of the tens of millions of women who had unwanted pregnancies due to legalizing abortion (tens of millions according to Levitt’s own numbers), the ones who went ahead and had abortions tended to be the more ambitious, better organized women, while some of the ones didn’t get around to having abortions were the more scatter-brained women.
    This model fits what we all saw on the streets a lot better than Levitt’s model. Urban black women had huge numbers of legal abortions from 1971 onward, far more than any other group. According to Levitt’s logic, that should have improved the black male teenagers of the late 1980s through early 1990s.Yet, what evidence is there from, say, 1990 to 1994 that black males born in 1971-1979 were better behaved than the previous generation? The better behaved generation of black teens actually were the ones born in the early 1980s, yet the nonwhite abortion rate peaked back in 1977.

    A reader writes:

    Regarding the press’s effusive response to Levitt’s theory that legalized abortion has cut crime rates:

    Many members of the educated classes probably believed this about abortion long before Levitt ever formalized the argument. His book has just made it more acceptable to talk about the subject openly. Poking holes in Levitt’s argument does not change minds among the educated elite because his theory happens to fit so well with their view of the world.

    For the educated, the process of having a child activates the same decision making skills as making a major career move. They can’t even imagine doing it without considering timing, finances, impact on their professional lives, and a host of other factors.

    They realize that accidents happen, of course — and that’s where abortion comes in. Abortion corrects family planning mistakes. It also allows the careless lower orders to catch up with themselves, the responsible users of birth control.

    The educated assume that, with abortion available to eliminate errors, live births surely must represent children that are planned (or at least actively wanted by the time they’re born). Given these assumptions, it just seems obvious to elites that abortion must be cutting crime by reducing the number of babies in the “unwanted” category.

    Maybe the chattering classes would find it less obvious if they could see the issue from evolution’s point of view — one in which planning and wantedness have nothing to do with reproduction.

    As far as nature is concerned, producing offspring is the default position. It’s just what living things do. Beating nature at her own game takes intelligence, foresight, and planning — all of which tend to be in short supply at the bottom rungs of society and among the low IQ population.

    Every means of avoiding baby production — abstinence, contraception, abortion –requires some level of self control, active decision-making, or competence. By contrast, producing a baby requires nothing more than having sex and waiting.

    Thus, it is almost inevitable that many babies will be born to women who are among the most impulsive, the least capable, and the least intelligent. How could it be otherwise? No need to even consider the issue of wantedness. It’s just evolution win
    ning again.

    Inopportune pregnancy obviously has been around for a long time. During the 15th through 19th centuries, many European countries apparently dealt with the resulting babies by dumping them into foundling homes, where the vast majority died from disease and malnutrition. Sarah Blaffer Hrdy discusses this in horrifying detail in her book *Mother Nature,* where she estimates that millions of babies were abandoned throughout Europe. Some foundling homes even installed revolving barrels so that parents could drop off infants anonymously.

    My guess is that the foundling home system, brutal as it was, probably was much more efficient than modern day abortion at culling the crime-prone and otherwise “least likely to succeed” babies.

    In past centuries, women who failed to acquire adequate economic resources through marriage or work would also have failed to keep their offspring alive. Without welfare available, unwed or poor mothers would have had little choice but to give their infants up to the foundling home, and to likely death. Thus, most women who successfully raised children would have been at least minimally competent in a social and economic context.

    By contrast, today’s “abortion + welfare” system virtually ensures that many of the most incompetent and least intelligent women will give birth and raise their children to adulthood. The likely result is an increase in crime, not a decrease.

    Many of those discussing Levitt’s argument coyly refer to it as “controversial,” while clearly thinking it’s a bit of a giggle. I wonder if they would find it so amusing to see what a really effective “preemptive execution” system looked like.

    Let me try to model this with numbers. The model that Levitt wants you to assume, even though he knows it’s not true, is something like the following:

    - Assume before the legalization of abortions that there are 100 conceptions and thus (ignoring miscarriages) 100 births.

    - Assume that abortion is legalized and the 25 “most unwanted” pregnancies are aborted.

    - Assume that “most unwanted” is roughly synonymous with “least promising.”

    - So, now only the 75 most promising fetuses are born and the 25 least promising never grow up to mug you. As J. Stalin liked to say while signing death warrants, “No man, no problem.”

    Now, it’s easy to see the lack of realism is these assumptions. The assumption that the 25 who get aborted will be the 25 least promising is grossly over-optimistic. For example, women are seldom making decisions on abortion not based on where their unborn children would come out relative to the other 99 but on other, more personal grounds. There might be a certain tendency in that direction, but it’s going to be attenuated.

    But, that’s just the surface of what’s wrong with this model. It’s actually radically fallacious because it doesn’t account for the vast increase in unwanted pregnancies, which is ethically sleazy of Levitt, because he knows all about what actually occurred.

    Here’s what really happened, according to Levitt’s own statement in Freakonomics: “Conceptions rose by nearly 30 percent, but births actually fell by 6 percent …”
    Thus, what happened looked more like this.

    - After legalization, there were now 129 conceptions, not 100, and 35 abortions, leaving 94 births instead of 100.

    - But who were those 94 births? This is where it gets terribly murky.

    — Some of those births will be of the 29 who wouldn’t have been conceived without legalization. Women got pregnant assuming, consciously or unconsciously, that they’d have an abortion, then didn’t get one for any of a host of reason. Will these kids turn out better or worse than the ones who are getting aborted? Who knows?

    The 94 births could have turned out more promising, less promising, or the same. Nobody knows, including Dr. Levitt.

    Hot debate. What do you think? Thumb up 26 Thumb down 30
    • ELi says:

      Yes, but my understanding was that the argument was based on the data from each state, where decreases in crime trailed the legalization of abortion. That is, the data tell us which of the competing (and perhaps equally appealing) theories is accurate. I admit, I’m not familiar with the data beyond what Levitt presents. Are the data false or misleading?

      Thumb up 1 Thumb down 0
  3. George B says:

    Levitt’s thesis is not an argument about the ethics of abortion. In fact, he may not have even framed his thesis in the most effective way. If he had a way to measure the number or rate of undesired pregnancies that were carried to term with the unwanted child kept by the birth mother he might have a better way to frame the problem to those that don’t believe in abortion. Levitt’s analyzes an unintended consequence of Roe v. Wade – a likely reduction of the crime rate. However, because his analysis concludes that unwanted children are much more likely to become criminals than wanted children, there are other solutions than abortion to help reduce crime.

    Those that believe abortion is wrong would benefit their cause by supporting alternatives to abortion to reduce the number of unwanted children. Churches that oppose birth control aren’t helping the cause of reducing the number of abortions, for example. Conservatives that oppose sex education and providing birth control to minors are likely to increase the abortion rate and/or the crime rate. Liberals who support generous welfare programs are likely to have the unintended consequence of increasing the crime rate by encouraging mothers to keep children that are unwanted other than for the payments.

    I suspect one factor contributing to the high rate of crime in the African American community is that black babies are more likely to end up in foster care than babies of other backgrounds. There is a huge demand for adopting white babies so no unwanted white child need be kept by the birth parents. If the adoption demand for black babies could be increased, it is reasonable to conclude that crime could be reduced.

    If conservatives want to decrease the abortion rate they could press to change laws that prevent mothers from benefiting financially from giving up babies. While we may view baby selling as unethical, it is rational to conclude that allowing baby selling would reduce the abortion rate.

    My primary point is that there are often unintended consequences to laws that we don’t recognize. When someone like Levitt identifies an unintended consequence he is providing information that helps us make informed decisions. Much of the discussion here seems to be missing that point.

    Well-loved. Like or Dislike: Thumb up 39 Thumb down 3
  4. I have found Contested Lives: The Abortion Debate in an American Community — by Faye D. Ginsburg to be very thought provoking.

    Thumb up 2 Thumb down 0
  5. Anonymous says:

    If a high birthrate among long income, single women is correlated with a high crime when these children grow up, then perhaps the baby boom after WWII can explain the high crime rate during the late 1960′s.

    Thumb up 2 Thumb down 1
    • Evelyn J Herron says:

      The baby boom after WWII was caused by returning GIs getting married soon after they left the service; the couple would have children soon thereafter. The GIs had lots of benefits. They could go to school on the GI bill. Many did so with a wife and children in tow because their monthly stipend paid for many of the expenses. Also, the wife would work, earning a PHT (Putting Hubby Through) degree.

      When they got married, they could buy a house on the GI Bill for no money down. Whole subdivisions of little houses were built to sell to GIs and their families.

      In the late 1940s when the baby boom began, it was a disgrace to have a baby out of wedlock. Typically, the guy would marry the pregnant girlfriend, especially if he was a GI and had the benefits described above. If the couple did not marry, the girl would go away somewhere, have the baby, and give it up for adoption. Therefore, the children were, for the most part, brought up in a conventional family–either birth or adoptive–and did not suffer the stigma of having an unwed mother who had to work 2 or 3 jobs to support her family, as we have today.

      So, no I don’t think the WWII baby boom can explain the “high crime” rate of the 1960s. However, the large numbers of babies born from 1946 to 1962 put a strain on the community infrastructure that served those children. Schools were suddenly overcrowded, and new ones had to be built rapidly. New teachers had to be trained in larger numbers to staff the increasing number of classrooms. In some states (California), schools ran two shifts–morning and afternoon–to accommodate the large number of children that came in waves each year, because the districts could not keep with the demand for more space. I don’t know how this affected the education that those children received.

      Well-loved. Like or Dislike: Thumb up 14 Thumb down 2
  6. Anonymous says:

    Hidden due to low comment rating. Click here to see.

    Disliked! Like or Dislike: Thumb up 5 Thumb down 38
    • Sarah says:

      They didn’t say all actions of a parent are irrelevant in determining the success of the child. Things like love and kindness do influence the child (more than education, for example), and unwanted children are less likely to receive either love or kindness.

      Well-loved. Like or Dislike: Thumb up 11 Thumb down 2
      • Bjorn says:

        Good thinking. And it is not necessarily the specific things they do for their children, but the fact that they care. Playing Bach for a fetus is probably nonsense, but someone who goes to that kind of length to give their child a leg up is probably also doing many other things to better their children’s chances, including some that work.

        Well-loved. Like or Dislike: Thumb up 9 Thumb down 2
    • ELi says:

      Or MIT and Harvard. One of the two.

      Thumb up 0 Thumb down 0
  7. Anonymous says:

    Do you have actual data and the numbers to back up your statements, or are you just spouting “conventional wisdom”? It’s clear you didn’t read the book and therefore have nothing useful to contribute other han to troll.

    Thumb up 6 Thumb down 9
  8. Norm Al says:

    OK, too many and too long. Let’s tighten up, people.

    Bottom line: could be abortion reduces crime, but also could be an example of correlation without causation.

    For example, it may be the legalization of abortion accompanied a cultural shift in those states toward a less stringent view of crime.

    Thumb up 4 Thumb down 7
    • Bjorn says:

      That could have been an explanation, if it was not for the fact that the very opposite was true.

      Well-loved. Like or Dislike: Thumb up 11 Thumb down 3